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MOBILIZATION OF THE MASSES: A SURVEY
OF COMMUNIST CHINESE LABOR LAW
GARY J. EDLES*
For the frst time in modern historY' a government appears to have found a
way-however brutal its human defects-to solve the problems of large
peasant unemploiment and labor surplus. The niobilization of the
unemployed mnass of Chinese rural workers through economic communes,
cottage industry, small pig-iron schemes, and all the rest is an
achievement whose political and intellectual impact in less developed areas
is bound to be immense.
John F. Kennedy
The Strategy of Peace 77 (1961)
I. THE BAsic AIM
"The fundamental aim of the Peking regime . . . is to heighten the
power of the state, in order to safeguard Communist rule at home and
...extend Communism abroad. In the economic field this aim calls,
in the Communist view, for a program of forced industrialization, to
transform the country from a 'feudal' and agrarian economy to a
modern industrial society capable of producing the latest weapons and
supporting the logistic burdens of modern warfare."'
A study of labor law and policy in Communist China must bear in
mind not the Western concepts of labor management relations-free
labor, seeking to obtain a better economic standard; free management,
seeking to increase profits; and together hammering out a mutually
agreeable collective contract around the bargaining table in an
environment in which the government's chief role is to insure the
equality of the parties-but rather the idea that labor and management,
together with the state, have as their primary duty increasing
production as a means of advancing the overall national purpose. Thus,
* Member ol the New York Bar. This article was originally prepared for a graduate seminar
at The George Washington University Law School and reflects solely the personal views of the
author,
I I P TANG, COMMUNIST CHINA TODAY 287 (2d ed. 1961). Professor John Fairbank points
out that if Peking's motives were popular welfare rather than national power, more than a mere
seventh of investment would go into light industry, as opposed to heavy, and less would go into
strategic railroads and armies. See J FAIRBANK, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 303 (rev. ed.
1958).
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the Preamble to the Constitution of the Trade Unions of the People's
Republic of China emphasizes that the raison d'etre of trade unions is
to insure the fulfillment-indeed, overfulfillment-of state production
plans.2 In speaking to the Eighth All-China Congress of Trade Unions
in 1957, Lai Jo-yu, late chairman of the presidium of the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) explained to his fellow union
members that "improvements in the livelihood of the workers and staff
must not be too fast nor excessive but should only be made step by
step on the basis of developing production and increasing labor
productivity."'3 Moreover, industrial labor is frequently relegated to a
subordinate position behind agricultural development on the scale of
Chinese priorities. This stems partly from the practical necessity of
providing sufficient food for China's immense population without
benefit of wide-scale farm mechanization, and partly from the
historically more important role which the peasants and farmers have
played in the rise of Communism in China.4
The view that labor should be utilized toward the end of national
achievement is not new to Chinese thought. Sun Yat-sen, the father of
modern China, believed that "workers not only owe their duty to their
organization, but they owe a greater duty to the country at large, and
must work to elevate China's position." 5 That traditional concept fit
nicely into the Communist plan for national control and Mao Tse-tung
quickly developed an appreciation of the power of a properly directed
labor movement toward the achievement of Communist aims. In a
speech to the Second National Congress of the Soviet Republic of
China as early as 1934, he said:
I solemnly propose to this Congress, that we take deep interest in
problems of the living conditions of the masses, from their land and
labour to their fuel, rice, cooking oil and salt . . . . We should make
them understand on the basis of these matters the tasks of a higher order
which we propose, namely the task of revolutionary war, so that they
2. For a translation of the Trade Union Constitution and other basic laws cited in this article,
see FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA (A. Blaustein ed. 1962).
3. ALL-CHINA FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS, REPORT OF 8TH ALL CHINA CONGRESS OF
TRADE UNIONS 43 (1958).
4. The estimated civilian employment in China in 1964 was approximately 331 million, or
about 75% of the working age population. About 85% of China's workers are engaged in
agriculture. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LABOR
DEVELOPMENTS ABROAD 7, 8 (1962).
5. Sun Yat-sen, Labor Day Address, I May 1924, quoted in LIN, LABOUR MOVLMLNT AND
LABOR LEGISLATION IN CHINA 17 (1933).
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will support the revolution and spread it throughout the country, and
respond to our political appeals and struggle to the last for the victory
of the revolution."
So it was not surprising that the idea of labor's duty to the country
was incorporated into the national law when the Communists came to
power. But, as we shall see, though the Communists seek to justify
forced industrialization and lack of concern for the individual well-
being in terms of national pride and communist ideology, in fact these
are often theoretical justifications for an underlying pragmatism which
permeates all of Communist legislation.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS
Labor law in China, like labor law in most countries, is largely a
creature of the industrial development of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, and unlike the more traditional areas of Chinese
law-marriage law, criminal law, property law-labor law draws more
from contemporary labor experience in the West than it does from
ancient Chinese philosophy.
Though the earliest reported cases dealing with labor matters in the
United States date to the early 1800s when the earliest labor unions
were formed, it was only in 1888 with the passage of the Arbitration
Act that the United States government became actively involved in the
problems of labor-management relations. In England, the decision to
establish an all-embracing union organization was made in 1834, and
by the 1870's, and the British economic boom, the unions had won an
acknowledged place in British society. Chinese labor development was
somewhat slower. The first of the Chinese industrial laws was the Mine
Regulations promulgated on March 11, 1914. A new and shorter set
of regulations, along with the first set of factory regulations, was
introduced in 1923. In general, the Mine Regulations established a 10-
hour day, an eight-hour day for boys under 17 and girls under 18,
prohibited child labor entirely in the more dangerous aspects of mine
operations, required two days rest per month with pay, and required
the mine owners to provide sanitary facilities and provide wages and
medical expenses in the event of injury.7 The Factory Regulations
established the eight-hour day but permitted a two-hour extension
6 \lxi) T,\-TUNG, MIND THE LiNI\G CONDITIONS OF THE MASSES AND ATTEND TO THE
Mr1 TIHl, Pi . , ORK (1958).
7 1 ur a dscussion of the earl. legislation, see LN. note 5, supra, at 115.
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under special circumstances. The Regulations also prohibited
dangerous work for women and children, outlawed night work for
children under 16 years of age, barred children under 14 from all forms
of factory work, required one day rest per week for all workers,
required the factory owner to provide proper sanitation, and provided
for medical expenses and two-thirds wages for up to six months in case
of industrial accident. The Factory Law called for the establishment of
a Joint Factory Council in every factory employing more than 30
workers with responsibility for dealing with employer-employee
disputes. Unfortunately, the law failed to provide for government
inspection and it was not until 1931 that a Factory Inspection Law was
passed.
While the passage of these early regulations indicated an acceptance
by the Chinese government of the principle of protection of labor by
legislation, the regulations were poorly, if ever, enforced. A report by
the Committee to Study Child Labor, appointed by the Shanghai
Municipal Council in 1924, observed that in the cotton mills "little
attention is paid to the state of the latrines and the stench near such
places is very marked . *..."8 The Commission was not convinced
"either that the Chinese regulations were satisfactory in themselves, or
that any measures were being taken to apply them . . . . " The
situation failed to improve under the Nationalist leadership and when
the National Social Administration Conference met in Chungking in
1942, its goals for the future were still-as they were close to 20 years
before-the eight-hour day, the regulation of child and female labor,
the establishment of a central factory and mine inspection system, and
the introduction of social insurance."0 A 1946 survey of T.K. Djang,
chief of the Chinese Bureau of Factory and Mine Inspection, showed
that most factories remained ill-equipped and factory legislation was
still largely ignored. All of China had only 18 factory inspectors, three
of whom were assigned to other duties. Indeed, there were even a few
cases where employers had never heard of the Factory Act or factory
inspection." As late as 1949 a sampling of five major industrial cities
in China revealed that not all factories had safety equipment. Periodic
reporting of accidents, although required by law, had made little
S. Note, 10 INT'L LAB. Rmv. 1005, 1016 (1924).
9. Id. at 1024.
10. See Labour Policy in China, 47 INT'L LAB. REv. 758-59 (1943).




progress since 1931; fire escapes and fencing of dangerous machines
were often neglected; and a few factories still gave no rest days during
the month.12
The craft guild (hong) has been a part of the Chinese way of life for
a long time, but the first serious approach to modern labor
organization occurred toward the end of World War I. During and
after the war Chinese industry had a chance to expand. Genuine
industrial areas grew up, and the peasants, for the first time, found a
serious alternative to the traditional agricultural life. Not only did this
new life lead to a large group of industrial workers, a new class ready
to give its allegiance to mass movements, but as Professor John
Fairbank noted, this new life created a class of people to whom the old
loyalties and customs no longer applied. 3 There was a breakdown in
the historic social code which stressed contentment, respect for
superiors and status quo, so that from 1918-1926 there were over 1,100
labor strikes. Where a mere eight unions were formed in the period
prior to 1920, over 700 emerged from 1921 to 1930. "After the first
National Labour Conference in 1922 . . . ," Professor Lin reported,
"the Labour Movement spread so rapidly .. .that it actually
prepared the way for the Nationalist Revolution of 1925."
The Communists have long occupied a significant place in the
Chinese labor movement. Their leaders were instrumental in organizing
the early unions and promoting the labor unrest of the 1920's. The
Communists played a key role in organizing general strikes including
the famous strike in Canton-Hong Kong which lasted four months and
involved over 200,000 workers. The leaders recognized that any hope
for total control of China lay ultimately with control of the peasants
and the working classes, although, at the time, their power base was
still weak. Michael Borodin then came to China from Russia in 1923.
Even though he served as an advisor to the ruling Kuomintang party,
he was nevertheless an important force in teaching organizational
techniques to the Communist leaders, who began to arouse the farmers
and workers to the need for social legislation. The Communists
mobilized labor as a political weapon in order to gain victories in the
period of the 1920's. At the Congress of the All-China Federation of
Labor in 1925, Communist leader Liu Shao-chi was chosen vice-
12 The survey is discussed in T. Chen, The Labour Policy of the Chinese Government and its
Reactions on Industry and Labour, 59 INT'L LAB. REv. 34, 39-48 (1949).
13. See FAIRBANK, note 1, supra, at 167.
14. See LIN, note 5,supra, at 83.
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chairman of the Central Executive Committee.15 Even Sun Yat-sen,
who was not a subscriber to the Communist philosophy, recognized the
Communist position in China and accepted their collaboration in his
Nationalist cause when he reorganized the ruling Kuomintang party
along Soviet lines in 1922. However, by 1927, Chiang Kai-shek had
crushed the Communist-led labor movement in Shanghai. Borodin was
forced to flee to Moscow and the Communists were compelled to
withdraw to the central mountains. During the 1930s and 1940s, the
Nationalists were able to maintain general control of labor although
there was some successful infiltration of the trade unions. During
World War II, the Communists expanded their geographical control
and by 1945 they had set up a Preparatory Committee of the Workers
Federation of China Liberated Areas which included some 920,000
members. The Communists finally initiated the calling of the Sixth
Congress of the All-China Federation of Labor in August, 1948 in the
city of Harbin which they occupied.
III. LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
The Communist view of labor law as a means of serving national
economic and political ends finds expression in every aspect of labor
management relations. "Work is a matter of honor,' 7 and the Party
Constitution limits membership to those who work and do not exploit
the labors of others. This philosophy, of course, promotes national
objectives.
Communist China prohibits labor strikes. Labor "discipline" must
be maintained at all times. A 1961 People's Daily editorial explained:
The responsibility system in socialist enterprises is a unification of the
revolutionary discipline and revolutionary self consciousness of the
'workers' class. In capitalist enterprises ... [the] responsibility system
reflecting the unjust relations of exploitation and oppression of man by
man, serves the interests of the capitalists and is a means of exploiting
the labor of the workers. However, since socialist enterprises are
enterprises of the people, the responsibility system . . . defines the
15. W. TUNG, THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN CHINA 153 (1964).
16. Pringsheim, Trade Union and the Communist Chinese, 46 S.W. Soc. Sci. Q. 111 (1965).
17. CONST. OF PEOPLE'S REPUB. OF CHINA art. 16.
18. See Regulations on Procedure for Settling Labor Disputes art. 9, cited in T. CHIAO, II




different responsibilities between different people on the basis of
comradeship. I9
The theory may be a bit facile and indeed questionable in the light of
earlier Communist dogma that the right of the worker to strike was
basic." Its practical significance cannot be minimized. Lesser offenses,
such as late arrival or early departure from work without a valid
excuse, or sitting idle during working hours, are similarly prohibited,
and each worker is required to keep a Labor Book, which details his
past record and which he is required to present to any new employer.
The book notes any breaches of labor discipline.21
Notwithstanding the prohibition against labor disruption, the past
three years of the Cultural Revolution has seen Chinese industry
wracked by strikes and economic sabotage as the forces loyal to
Chairman Mao attempted to extend the doctrines of the Revolution
into the factories.2 2 In some instances, pro-Mao forces took control and
set up worker committees to operate the factories, ousting the plant
managers, but in several cases the government was forced to send
troops in order to get the factories back into operation. Military
control now appears to have been phased out in favor of control by
supervisory committees composed of workers, local party leaders, and
members of the military. The actual operation of the plants will
probably be left to these committees.23
There is no collective bargaining in the Western sense, although the
government encourages collective agreements as a means of
establishing the rights and duties of labor and management. By
requiring that certain items are included in each agreement, the
government's primary goal of increased production is also achieved.
All contracts must contain an exposition of the principal targets
approved by the state in production, technical and financial plans. They
must also indicate the problems which the factory administration must
solve in order to insure the fulfillment of state production plans, the
19 Peking People's Daily, 17 December 1961, reprinted in CHINA RESEARCH ASSOCIATES,
COMMUNIST CHINA YEARBOOK 1963 [Hereinafter cited as CHINA RESEARCH ASSOCIATES].
20 The Party's First Manifesto on the Current Situation, issued 10 June 1922, included a
demand of freedom to strike. The Labor Code of the Chinese Soviet Republic guaranteed the right
to strike. ,Se. Y GLUCKSTEIN, MAO'S CHINA 214-15 (1957) [Hereinafter cited as GLUCKSTEIN].
21 See Outlinc of Labor Relations for State Operated Enterprises, 6 May 1954, reprinted in
GLUCKSTLIN at 215-16.
22 N.Y. Times, 20 January 1967, at I, col. 5, N.Y. Times, 11 January 1967, at I, col. 1.
23. N.Y. Times, 21 March 1967, at 16, col. 3.
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organization of the workers, and the learning of new techniques.', The
contract must provide for the improvement of safety and health
conditions, acknowledge the responsibility of management for
improving the workers' living conditions and the strengthening of labor
discipline, and must include a system of awards and "compensation
according to labor." Additionally, the government has established the
procedure for both drafting the collective contract-which includes the
use of drafting committees and ultimate ratification of the contract by
membership vote-and for settling labor disputes, which includes
governmental mediation and, ultimately, arbitration.25 There is
provision for limited judicial review in the event of an unfavorable
arbitration decision, but it should be remembered that the courts, being
responsible to the Peoples' Assemblies, frequently reflect governmental
emphasis on increased production as the ultimate goal.26 The
Regulations apply to all state and cooperative enterprises,2 although
in practice the state arbitration hierarchy ordinarily deals with disputes
between enterprises rather than with ordinary labor problems. Most
individual grievances are processed by a worker committee, headed by
a Party official, or by the Enterprise committee.
Under the Communist scheme, labor-shares the theoretical
responsibility for internal plant management via the vehicle of the trade
union or the workers' congress. In state enterprises, the union
represents the workers in the administration "of production and
concluding agreements with management. In the days of private
enterprise, the union negotiated contracts and appointed members to
private industry's labor-management committee. 2 The role of the
union has been somewhat clouded as a result of the events of the past
three years.
Labor management committees were not particularly successful. In
1956, they were replaced by the workers' congresses similarly designed
24. See, e.g., Joint Directive of Ministry of Heavy Industry and National Commission of
Heavy Industry Trade Unions on Signing of Collective Agreements, 11 April 1955, reprinted in
UNITED STATES JOINT PUBLICATION RESEARCH SERVICE, LABOR LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN
COMMUNIST CHINA 27 (1958).
25. See REGULATIONS, note 18, supra, at 84-86.
26. For an excellent article on the role of law in Communist China generally, see Lee, Chinese
Communist Law, 60 MICH. L. REv. 439 (1962).
27. Articles 5 and 10 of the Chinese Constitution permit private enterprise, but none has existed
since private industry was brought under state or joint control in 1936.
28. See Ayers, Labor Policy and Factory Management in Communist China, 277 ANNALS
AMER. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 124, 128 (1951).
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to draw the masses into participation in management. According to an
article in Red Flag, these congresses were to participate in plant
management.
Their wisdom and strength must be relied upon if the enterprises owned
by the whole nation are to properly run .. . . [A Congress] has the
right to hear and discuss the enterprises' production, financial, technical
and wage plans; to examine and study the enterprise bonus foundation
funds, welfare fund, labor production fund, trade union fund and other
expenditures for the livelihood and welfare of the workers; and provided
the directives of higher authorities are not violated, to adopt resolutions
concerning the above mentioned outlays."
In keeping with overall labor policy:
a workers' congress should be a congress that closely links itself with
and directly promotes production. In order to achieve this purpose, the
content of the workers' congress must be centered on production ....
[Wlhen we stress the need for a workers' congress to conduct its
activities in close coordination with and promote production we do not
mean that we should not deal with problems of livelihood and welfare
of workers ....
Under the industrialization plan inaugurated in 1958, workers were
to be organized to participate directly in plant management while
members of management were to be required to join in the physical
labor. However, with the collapse of the Great Leap Forward in 1960,
there was a re-emergence of the enterprise manager and an attempt to
upgrade the position of technical personnel.3 1 The government remained
somewhat reluctant to commit itself fully to a policy of production
governed by professional managers, however, and the recent Cultural
Revolution brought about a return of party officials into positions of
responsibility throughout industry. The government can be expected to
upgrade technical competence although it undoubtedly will maintain
firm political control of industry. It was toward this end that a Red
Flag editorial recently emphasized that the "Revolution must be put
in command of production, to guard against capitalist restoration. ' '3
29 Red Flag, 16 January 1962, reprinted in CHINA RESEARCH Assoc., at 386.
30 Id. at 390.
31 See Li, China's Industrial Development, 17 CHINA Q. 3, 27-28.
32 Red Flag, 1 July 1969, translated in CONSUL GENERAL, HONG KONG, SURVEY OF THE
CHINA MAINLAND PRESS, No. 663, 8 August 1969 [hereinafter SCMP].
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IV. CONTROL OF LABOR
Although China's single greatest asset unquestionably is its labor
supply, there remains a continuing need for labor. The Communists
have utilized wide-scale recruiting campaigns to attract and develop the
additional supply. In absolute numbers, China has an immense number
of working-age people but their proportion of the total population is
considerably below that in many of the more advanced countries. In
many industrial nations, less than 25% of the population is under 15
and unproductive. But in Communist China, the total approaches
40%.21 Unlike the more mechanized countries, about eighty-five percent
of the Chinese population is still needed to feed the country. 4
Ordinary labor came under government contol late in 1954. During
the period of the First Five Year Plan, it is estimated that over eight
million people migrated permanently into cities and towns looking for
employment. The situation became so acute that Peking was forced to
order millions of peasants to return to the countryside. Chou En-lai,
in a report printed in People's Daily in June, 1957, warned that "the
major direction of their [peasants'] employment for a long time to come
must lie in agriculture, with handicrafts and service trades as a
subsidiary outlet. ' '11 In spite of the social prejudice against household
employment, the government encouraged the hiring of domestic help as
a means of meeting the critical unemployment problem. New mass
migrations of people have been ordered by the government recently as
students, other young people, and city dwellers are being redirected in
order to supplement the working force in rural areas. Between 1960 and
1962 the government claimed to have transferred 20 million workers
to the countryside .3 There are other estimates that perhaps 25 million
Chinese ultimately will be involved.3 1
Little is known about the Chinese method of redirecting huge masses
of unemployed workers back to the countryside, but several methods
appear to have been employed. In July, 1954, the Outline of Labour
Regulations for State Operated Enterprises provided strict regulation
of employment, transfer and dismissal of employees. By mid-1955, the
33. L. ORLEANS, PROFESSIONAL MANPOWER & EDUCATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA 147 (1960).
34. LINDQVIST, INSIDE CHINA 31 (1963).
35. Chou En-lai, Report on the Work of the Government, Peoples Daily, 27 June 1957, quoted
in C. LI, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNIST CHINA 203 (1959).
36. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LABOR
DEVELOPMENTS ABROAD (1967).
37. N.Y. Times, 6 April 1969, at 1, col. 5.
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government had forbidden the free hiring of workers in state enterprises
and required that additions to the regular work staff be approved either
by a group superior to the individual factory or by the Ministry of
Labor. In November, 1957, additional directives were issued
concerning apprentices and unskilled labor. The Chinese readily admit
that these draft regulations, in addition to one concerning home leave
for employees separated from their families, were designed to stem the
flow of workers and their families into the cities."8
The government also made consumer goods more available in rural
areas in an attempt to entice workers back to the farms39 and rationing
has been used to control population migration." The manipulation of
wages is yet another control device. During the peak unemployment
period in 1957, for example, regulations were promulgated requiring
that all peasant workers receive wages equal to those received by the
factory workers." It is impossible to know which economic incentives
were employed in the recent governmental attempt to move large
numbers of people back to the rural areas. Such incentives, however,
if they were employed, were coupled with liberal applications of
Communist dogma. A major theme in the Chinese press has been the
reeducation of intellectuals. Intellectual youth, it is reasoned, must
become integrated with the working class in order to become a
sufficiently trained revolutionary group.
The need for trained personnel always has been crucial, and skilled
and technical workers, because of their scarcity, have been under close
state control since 1953. A 1952 directive by the Administrative
Council ordered the recruitment and training of intellectuals, ex-
Kuomintang officers and former governmental officials. Official
directives in the spring of 1955 indicated that the number of technical
graduates was still inadequate and that there had been some improper
employment of technical personnel to the degree that about seven per
cent of the technical graduates had been improperly assigned to
38 Peking Chinese Home Service, 20 November 1957, translated in CONSUL GENERAL, HONG
KONG, FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 21 November 1957,
[Hereinafter cited as FBISJ.
39 See New China Ne~s Agency Service, Shanghai, 22 December 1961, in SCMP, No. 2648,
29 Dec 1961.
40 Rationing of certain items has been in effect in China since 1955, rationing for almost all
industrial items ent into effect in Peking in April, 1962. See FBIS, 23 October 1962.
41 DRAtT PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS COVERING WAGES FOR ORDINARY AND
MisCI LLXNIOLS WORKERS in SCMP, 9 December 1957,
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administrative jobs. 2 An official reprimand was issued to those units
which had overemphasized their needs in order to be sure of obtaining
a sufficient number of technically trained workers, with the result that
some units were understaffed. The government ordered a thorough
investigation of conditions of employment of technical graduates; an
analysis of job assignments; systematic, organized training and periodic
inspection of progress. The assignment of medical personnel was
henceforth to be accomplished by local government rather than Peking.
There was to be extensive organization and training of graduates of
upper middle schools who failed the entrance examinations to
institutions of higher learning, of graduates of short courses in
engineering and agriculture, and of recently "rehabilitated youths with
social education" so that they could serve in elementary schools and
industrial and agricultural enterprises. The absolute control with which
the Peking government runs the labor market was evidenced most
clearly by the assignment of technical graduates. Notwithstanding the
preferences of the individuals involved, 29% of the 53,000 persons
graduated from all institutions of higher learning in 1955, for example,
were assigned to heavy industry, 16% were permitted further education,
15% were assigned to light industry, forestry, transportation and
financial business, 2% went into the army, and about 38% were
assigned to government administration. 3 Recently, the government
again has sent young people to assignments in farm areas and factories,
often with little prospect for a return to an urban environment.44
The drive to develop technically trained personnel has been
somewhat successful for, between 1952 and 1957, the technical
personnel increased from about 170,000 to over 800,000. However,
People's Daily, in a 1966 article, continued to complain that the
technical level of several departments still lagged behind that of the
more advanced nations,4 5 and the recent disruptions during the Cultural
Revolution resulted in a substantial decrease in the number of trained
technicians. A report by the Japanese Foreign Ministry estimated that
42. See DIRECTIVE OF MINISTRY OF FUEL INDUSTRY CONCERNING ASSIGNMENT EMPLOYMENT
AND TRAINING OF GRADUATES OF UNIVERSITIES, SPECIAL AND INTERMEDIATE TECHNICAL
SCHOOLS, 22 June 1955, reprinted in UNITED STATES JOINT PUBLICATION RESEARCH SERVICE,
note 24, supra, at 21.
43. STATE COUNCIL DIRECTIVE CONCERNING ASSIGNMENT PROGRAM FOR GRADUATES OF ALL
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING, 21 October 1959, reprinted in UNITED STATES JOINT
PUBLICATION RESEARCH SERVICE, note 24, supra, at 20.
44. N.Y. Times, 6 May 1969, at 3, col. 6.
45. People's Daily, 1 January 1966, reprinted in FBIS, 4 January, 1966.
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the closing of schools during the Cultural Revolution means that over
400,000 trained workers (including 90,000 teachers and 140,000
industrial technicians) could not complete their training during 1967
and 1968.16
Forced-or corvee-labor is an additional method by which the
government controls the working force in the national interest. Forced
labor has a long tradition in China. This type of labor made possible
the building of the Great Wall, and during World War 11 the
Nationalist regime required service by all males between the ages of
eighteen and thirty, although it was possible to provide a substitute in
those cases where it was not practical to interrupt one's normal
occupational duties." To the Communists, forced labor was the ideal
way to adapt Chinese tradition in order to increase production while
controlling dissident members of the population. Article 4 of the Labor
Service Regulations reflects the Communist philosophy by requiring a
strict policy of coordinating punishment and control with ideological
reform and coordinating labor production with political education.
Outsiders estimate that at one time, seven million Chinese were held
in forced labor camps where, organized into Labor Service for Reform
Corps, they did developmental projects." According to Communist
reports, during a 10-month period in 1958, forty to fifty million army
personnel, though not forced labor in the strict sense, were involved in
construction projects. However, forced labor plays its chief role in
agricultural and public works projects and not industrial development.
The Chinese recently adopted an experiment in labor rotation where
people work alternately in industry and farming in an attempt to direct
labor to where it is needed most. Under the rotation plan, peasants
work for three to seven years in factories in nearby cities. They return
to their farms at about age 26 when they are still able to make a
contribution to farm life. In addition to this rotation, seasonal
integration, whereby peasants are used in factories during the busy
seasons and return to their farms during the harvest or planting
periods, is employed. Seasonal integration has been particularly
successful in industries such as sugar production where much depends
on the quantity of the harvest. The Chinese consider the use of these
46 N.Y. Times, 10 May 1969, at 10, col. 4.
47 (ompu[t orv Labour Sericc' in China, 49 INT'L LAB. REv. 515 (1944).
48 I P TU.G. COMMUNIST CHINA TODAi 278 (2d ed. 1961). About 10,000 workers, for
example. Aere used to enlarge Yentung Airport.
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contract workers-they are not regularly employed at the factory-a
revolutionary approach to labor problems.
V. WAGES AND EMULATION
The wage structure, combined with the labor emulation program,
has been used to effectuate greater productivity. In Communist theory,
"hour wages and piece wages ar6 the main forms to give effect to the
principle of distribution according to work."49 But the explanation
appears to be only another theoretical justification since Communist
philosophy, as expressed in the Fourth Manifesto of the Party on the
Current Situation (issued in 1925 when the Party was striving for
popular support) specifically rejected the piecework system.50 There has
been a dialogue within China concerning the theoretical justification for
the wage structure, and the Communists appear to be changing from
a defense of the system to an official position which recognizes that
piece wages are but a temporary evil. The Peking Daily reported:
At the present stage of development of productive forces, 'to each
according to his work' is unavoidable. But unlike the metaphysicians we
do not regard it as an eternal thing. We affirm it simply for the purposes
of creating conditions for its annihilation. At an appropriate moment we
will annihilate it and push the society to a higher plane, i.e., the
communist phase in which the 'for each according to his ability, to each
according to his needs' principle is observed."
The wage level of workers has risen steadily, though slowly, during
the period of Communist control. According to official figures, by
1952 the wage level in state-owned enterprises had reached or surpassed
the level existing before World War I1,52 but a 1965 report noted that
the factory wage-about $22 per month for unskilled workers, to about
$45 per month for top skilled workers-is low even by Chinese
standards. However, it is all that productivity will allow.5 3
Prior to 1955, workers were paid yia the "work point-payment in
kind" system. Workers were divided into eight basic categories (grades
49. People's Daily, 6 March 1962, reprinted in CHINA RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, A TENTATIVE
DISCUSSION ON THE INCENTIVE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, note 19, supra. at 392.
50. GLUCKSTEIN at 227.
51. Peking Daily, 16 October 1958, reprinted in SCMP, No. 537, 22 October 1958.
52. CHINESE vORKERS MARCH TOWARD SOCIALISM 36 (1956).
53. Gayn, Red China Today: Nation Obsessed By Industrialization, N.Y. Times, 9 June 1965,
at 12, col. 2. Some observers suggest that the wage level still remains below that of the best pre-
World War II years, 1935-1936.
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1-3 required simple skills, 4-5 involved semi-skilled work, and 6-8 were
skilled personnel) and the level was adjusted to account for political
standing and the importance of the industry in the over-all national
scheme. Work points were geared to the cost of living, determined
regionally, and hinged on fixed prices for basic commodities such as
oil, salt, coal, grain or cloth. Wage units, often called Parity Deposit
Units, reflected the local buying power and were designed to curb the
effects of price fluctuation and keep wages on a steady level of real
value. However, there were wide regional differences and even broad
discrepencies in wages within a particular grade within a region.
Additional compensation was based on individual worker need.
In 1955, China switched to a pure wage system where payment
depended exclusively on actual work completed. In a directive signed
by Chou En-lai, the Government indicated that payment in kind "no
longer accords with the principle of 'compensation according to labor'
and that of 'equal work, equal compensation."' 54 Effective in 1955, all
workers became responsible for their own expenses and those living in
government housing were required to pay rent. Further, the old work
point scale, premised on basic commodities, was replaced by a
monetary scale. However, the State Council arranged to supply goods
to various areas while the wage system was being implemented and
permitted subsidies from the welfare fund to those workers who would
experience hardship because of large families. The wage reform laid
great stress on material incentives and some of the wage increases given
in June, 1956, were aimed at widening the skill differentials to promote
competition and make adjustments for groups whose activities were
considered important to society.55 Piece rates were abolished in 1958
when a system based on standard differentials premised on skill,
working conditions, and bonuses finally became generally used.56
The labor emulation program (Stakhanovism, named for a coal
miner who was an early production hero) involves a series of
campaigns designed to stimulate production by encouraging
competition among factories and enterprises, and rewarding
S4 'I -fi CUNCIL DECREE CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VAGE SYSTEM AND
I1i ( H\\40 14) Tilt P\\ %F\T O1- \VNGIS IN N IONEY WITH RESPECT TO ALL GOLRNXIENT
\, RK1 R\ 31 August 1955 repritedin L\[TI:D STxiT-S JOINT PUBLICATION RESEARCH SERVICE.
I \IIO J_ \\D RI-G r.1 'TIONS I\ COM\1\ NIST CHI\A 2 (1958).
55 T HLc IAS & D. LUARD, THE ECONowIC DEELOPMENT OF COMMUNIST CHINA (1949-1958)
120 11959)
S6 BHRI \t' OF LABOR STATISTICS. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LABOR
Di F, iwmi \[-, \BROAD 2-3 (1967).
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outstanding workers for new inventions or increased output. During an
emulation campaign, each factory is given a production target based
on the over-all state plan and the factory then proceeds to implement
individual plans for each of its employees. Ordinarily, the local
government or trade union augments the campaign with a propaganda
drive encouraging the workers to meet their goals. The New Records
Campaign and the Labor Hero Movement place their emphasis on
significant achievement in new inventions and increased individual
production. During the period of the First Five Year Plan, there had
been emphasis on material incentives as the means of increasing
production. Regulations provided for monetary awards for suggestions
making important improvements in technical processing, machinery or
inventions. The amount of the award was computed according to the
value of the amount saved in the twelve-month period after the
invention or improvement was put into effect. Those assisting the
primary inventor received a separate award, equal to about 25% of the
main award. Other material benefits included bonuses or greater social
insurance benefits.5 7
Beginning with an editorial in People's Daily on November 21, 1957,
the government began a change-over to non-material incentives with
greater stress being placed on the social status of the individual worker
hero or team champion. Anticipating the Great Leap Forward, a
campaign designed to begin in 1958, the regime attempted to forestall
a repetition of the high accident rate, suspected sabotage and
deterioration in morale which had marked the First Five Year Plan to
achieve increases in production largely through material incentives.
Professor de Bernis of the University of Grenoble, who spent five weeks
in China in 1958, reported:
[I]n an East Peiping textile mill I saw bulletin boards, small flags
marking the records set by different teams of workers, production
graphs, and the reminders of the state five year plan . . . . The Chinese
read of economic development the way Americans read about
sports . . . . There are parades and stories in newspapers every time a
contest is won, a record broken, or a new product or method of
production is discovered."
This policy of emphasizing non-material incentives met with limited
57. See PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS ON AWARDS, FOR INVENTION, TECHNICAL IMPROVEMENTS
AND RATIONALIZATIONS PROPOSALS CONCERNING PRODUCTION, 6 May 1954. Similar awards are
available to outstanding scientists.
58. DeBernis, What ISaw In Red China. 190 CATHOLIC WORLD 230, 231-32 (1960).
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success as the fiasco of the Great Leap Forward partly demonstrated.
It was replaced by the piece rate and reward systems by late 1960. By
1961, the overwhelming proportion of state enterprises were again
under either an hourly wage plus reward, or some form of piece wage
rate. "Experience has shown," the government was forced to concede
in 1962, "that only when ideo-political work is combined with material
encouragement can the individual, immediate interests of the laborer be
merged with the collective, long-term interests, thereby fully mobilizing
the laborer's enthusiasm for production to speed up socialist
construction. "'9
In mid-1963, the government decided upon a new approach and a
broadcast over the New China News Agency discussed an effective
method used to increase production in several Shanghai factories. Each
factory compared its targets with more advanced factories, evaluated
the differences between the two, and adopted methods of improving the
work. Within the year the Chinese had their most recent emulation
campaign-"Compare With, Learn From and Catch Up With"-in
full swing. But unlike previous campaigns, this one stressed both
quantity and quality and appears to have been designed as a middle
ground between the use of material and political incentives. The
Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Light Industry indicated that "an
important characteristic of the campaign . . . is to implement in an
overall manner the spirit of the general line for carrying out production
with greater, faster, better, more economical results with emphasis on
the quality of products."10 Quality and austerity have become the
watchwords; newspaper articles popularizing economy drives, mutual
savings societies, thrift campaigns and technical innovations occupy
front page positions. It appears that the emulation program, early
geared to increased production only, with limited concern for workers,
developed increased sophistication and shifted emphasis in the hope of
producing quality products while maintaining worker morale. In fact,
a major aspect of the Cultural Revolution has been a return to
ideological, rather than material, incentives."
It is difficult to say how successful the combined programs have
been. In absolute terms, of course, China's industrial growth during the
past two decades has been enormous. There have been setbacks,
59 Cmu\.A RI-%ARCH ASSOCIATEs at 397.
60 Peking \Vorkcr's Daily, 6 March 1964, r'printedin SCMP, No. 3118, 31 March 1964.
61 Bi_ Ri \t o- LABOR ST,\TISTC,. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. LABOR
)I \I f P\11 \P, \BRO \D I (July 1968).
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particularly in agriculture, and since the failure of the Great Leap
Forward in the late 1950's there has been an increasing governmental
concern for the agricultural segment of the nation. Production of rice,
wheat and grain, for example, barely reached 180 million tons in 1965,
which is somewhat less than food output in 1957, when there were
about 100 million fewer Chinese to feed.82 In 1963, the Central
Committee called for a shift in work of the industrial sections of the
economy into the orbit of agriculture, noting that only when there is
sufficient food supply could industry be speedily expanded. At the
moment, the leaders seem to be pacing themselves, trying to maintain
high production levels without sacrificing quality or increasing worker
resentment with an over-all design of using industry to assist
agricultural growth.
VI. EDUCATION
"We insist on the educational principle of all-around development.
We consider that the only method to train human beings in all-round
development is to educate them to serve working class politics and
combine education with productive labor.163
The Communists always have had a genuine philosophical
commitment to education as a method of increasing popular support
for national programs. They skillfully adapted the traditional means of
learning to current needs through a change in curriculum and made
several innovations in mass education. In the early years of the regime,
the key problem facing the government was to offer the masses a
rudimentary education in the doctrine of class struggle while
simultaneously developing basic skills such as reading and writing.
Spare time schools, generally run by the factories for their employees,
were the answer. These schools developed slowly. Many enterprises
elected to send key workers to full time technical schools or short
courses rather than establish their own spare time institutions. The
practice changed in the mid-1950's as the demand for workers to
remain in the factories increased and more complete factory schools
were established. The problems of inadequate funding, lack of time for
proper study, inadequate numbers of qualified teachers and the lack of
qualifications of the average student kept the program from rolling
62. See Washington Post, 16 January 1966, § L. at I, col. 3.
63. Lu Ting-yi, Education Must Be Combined with Productive Labour. Red Flag, I July 1958,
reprinted in CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND EAST ASIAN RESEARCH CENTER,
COMMUNIST CHINA 1955-1959, POLICY DOCUMENTS WITH ANALYSIS 445 (1962).
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along smoothly. During the late 1950's, disruptions in the work
schedule, transfer of workers, and changes in shifts as a result of the
severe economic problems further disrupted the spare time program by
interfering with regular class scheduling. When workers were shifted to
the countryside in the fall of 1959 to help combat the deteriorating
agricultural situation, articles began to appear in the newspapers noting
the general slow-down in the spare time program. In Tientsin, the
largest industrial city in northern China, for example, enrollment
figures climbed from 200,000 workers in 1958, to more than 400,900
with the momentum of the Great Leap Forward, but slipped to about
70,000 by 1962. Despite the 1955 goal of the National Conference on
Spare Time Education-the eradication of illiteracy within three
years-a report to the National Conference of Advanced Cultural and
Educational Workers as late as 1960 merely advanced the hope that it
was possible to "basically eradicate illiteracy among all young and able
bodied workers within the next year or two." 4 While the Communists
have made significant strides, the problem has not yet been completely
solved and there was evidence of retrogression among workers who had
recently learned to read and write. Nevertheless, the government
claimed in 1964 that 80% of the population could be classified as
literate. 5
A second important form of education developed in China is the
half-work, half-study school designed to be a self-supporting institution
generally associated with a commune. The plan for these schools was
adopted in 1958, and the most highly publicized and widespread form
of school was the agricultural middle school, designed to fill the gap
of education which had failed to penetrate into rural areas. The school
takes students of normal junior middle school age (13-16) and teaches
four basic subjects: Chinese language, mathematics, agriculture
(including basic techniques of crop cultivation, irrigation and fertilizer
application), and, of course, politics. Each school has its own
agricultural or industrial plant whose production plans are
incorporated into the basic commune plan. The work done by the
students in the fields or factory is designed to offset the cost of
operating the school.
The government views these schools as a means of satisfying the
popular demand for post-primary education and as a method 6f
64 Pcoplc's Daily, 3 June 1960, reprinted in PRIESTLY. VORKERS OF CHINA 102 (1963).
65 BtiR) L w LABOR ST\TISTICS,. NITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LABOR
D) -1i0 '\lI \T1, \BRO\O 7 (April 1967).
Vol. 1969: 3951
Washington University Open Scholarship
414 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1969: 395
training large numbers of youth in rural areas to serve the communes
in a variety of lower level technical and administrative jobs requiring
basic middle junior school education plus agricultural training. The
schools, in theory, could function with fewer teachers and meet the
ideological requirement that education be coupled with productive
labor. Most important, the student body could be utilized for
productive work without sacrificing political indoctrination.
From the outset these schools were troubled with a lack of qualified
teachers, a lack of adequate facilities, shortages of funds, a poor
distribution of time between labor and schooling, and less than
enthusiastic administration. During the spring and summer of 1960 and
into 1961, there was little indication in mainland publications as to the
activities of these half-work half-study institutions. The opinion was
voiced that the schools had run into new and even larger problems.
Finally, in the fall of 1961, a conference held in Fukien called for a
"re-establishment" of a number of these schools in that province. A
modified half-work half-study program was then reinstituted in early
1962. Under the new system, schools would no longer devote alternate
days to work and production as they had done previously, but would
run full time during the slack season of about four months with the
students returning to their homes to work in the fields during the
remainder of the time. While school is not in session, students are
expected to participate in small group discussions or self-study. Schools
are now financed by tuition payments, instead of income from labor,
with additional funds provided by the communes themselves or by the
government.
In 1964, a television work-study school was established to offer
courses in mathematics, Chinese language and literature, and political
science to senior primary school students who could not enter full-time
junior middle schools. Lessons are taught under the pre-1962 system
with three periods every morning devoted to study, three periods a week
devoted to private study, and three afternoons a week devoted to
work.66
The 1950 directives assigned responsibility for all phases of education
in the plants to the union. Management's role initially involved
supplying facilities for the classes, but management later undertook
increasing responsibility for teaching cultural and technical subjects.




Educational programs are, at all times, geared to the implementation
of the Party program, and this aspect has generally remained the
exclusive responsibility of the union cadre. In 1953-54, for example, the
annual theme was the strengthening of work discipline; the 1956
program was more directly concerned with production and how to
improve it. When the working class morale was affected by a series of
natural disasters in 1960-61, however, lectures and discussions were
organized to induce a return to confidence. With the decentralization
of the control of eduction in 1958, administration shifted to the
Enterprise party committee and management was relieved of its
responsibilities. Now the party committee retains control, though
formal authority and routine administration is assigned to the unions.
Informal methods of education are also used. The government sends
newspapers and simple picture books into the local villages several
times a week to stimulate the literacy campaign. And the government,
at all times, attempts to increase the social pressure against illiteracy. 7
The recent period of the Cultural Revolution saw a total breakdown
in the educational system. All educational institutions were closed in
the spring of 1966 and a general educational reform was begun. Only
in the past year or so have schools reopened. Changes in educational
policy, or, more correctly, a return to older policies, seem to be a major
legacy of the Cultural Revolution. It appears that the basic educational
course will be reduced from 12 to nine years, and higher education will
be downgraded except in science and engineering."' Competitive
entrance examinations for upper middle schools and universities
probably will be replaced by a recommendation procedure which places
greater emphasis on giving the limited vacancies to young people with
"acceptable" political views. There will undoubtedly be yet another
attempt to merge the schools and factories. Red Flag, in fact, recently
expressed the hope that education would be taken from the intellectuals
and returned to the control of the working classes. 9
VII. SAFETY REGULATION
When the Communists came to power in 1949, safety regulation was
either nonexistent or ineffective. Early attempts by the Communists to
correct the situation were not completely successful but there has been
67. -Ste W GLDDES, PEASANT LIFE IN COMLNISIL\isr CHINA 14 (1963).
6K. N 'i Times, I I May 1969, at 7, col. 1; N.Y. Times, 24 July 1968, at 14, col. I.
69 Red Flag, 14 October 1968, reprimd in SC NIP, 12 November 1968.
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a conscientious effort on the government's part to improve the
conditions in factories and other state enterprises. State Council
regulations, passed in 1956, provide the basic rules for safety and
sanitation in factories, installations, and building projects.0 Unlike the
rather haphazard enforcement which characterized Nationalist
attempts at factory supervision before 1949, safety checks are now
conducted on a periodic basis and many mines and factories now
require their workers to attend safety classes and pass safety
examinations. Where specific problems arise, government regulations
are adopted,71 and safety and hygiene receive constant publicity.
A national conference on industrial hygiene and occupational
diseases, at which over 500 papers were submitted, was held in 1964.1
A special shop in Shanghai, at which more than 400 industrial safety
and health devices are available, opened 14 retail branches in 1965.
Most important, the "Anticipate 100 Accidents" campaign, begun in
1961, is designed to indoctrinate the workers to the laws of industrial
safety. Each factory is required to make long-term anticipations
regarding possible accidents based on their general operation. Next,
seasonal checks are made. Finally, daily inspections are made on the
basis of actual operation on given days and for given shifts. This series
of inspections is designed to uncover unsafe conditions, make repairs
when necessary and eliminate unsafe conditions or practices. There are,
of course, reports of factories which still do not have adequate safety
equipment, and the safety program will never be totally successful as
long as the government pushes hard for ever-increasing production.
However, with the recent shift in emphasis from quantity to quality of
production, there could be a corresponding decrease in accidents.
VIII. SOCIAL INSURANCE
Although the Peking government spends an equivalent of millions of
dollars for labor insurance in the state-owned and publicly operated
70. STATE COUNCIL REGULATIONS ON FACTORY SAFETY AND SANITATION, 25 May 1956;
STATE COUNCIL REGULATIONS GOVERNING SAFE WORKING CONDITIONS IN BUILDING
CONSTRUCTION AND INSTALLATION PROJECTS, 25 May 1956.
71. Regulations concerning the prevention of silicosis, for example, coupled with the proper use
of ventilation systems, protective clothing, artificial sun rays and proper sanitation in the mines
led to a marked reduction in the disease. See SCM P, No. 3170, 3 March 1964.




factories annually, there are indications that insurance benefits are still
a plum for the favored worker. Equally important, the bulk of the
working population-particularly in agriculture-is unaffected by
labor legislation."
The basic insurance regulations, formulated in 1951 (and amended
in 1953 to extend coverage to more industries, eliminate certain time
limitations on the receipt of benefits, and raise the amount of benefits),
are applicable to all state-owned and cooperative factories, mines and
other enterprises employing over 100 persons.74 The total cost of the
program is borne by management which pays into an insurance fund
an amount equal to 3% of the total payroll. The fund pays the total
expense of treatment, medicine and hospitalization for both on-the-job
and off-the-job sickness and injury. In the case of off-the-job injury or
illness, the cost of expensive medicine, hospital meals and travel
expenses are borne by the patient unless he is economically unable to
pay. During the period of confinement for a work-related disability,
full wages are continued. Non-work related disabilities allow a worker
60-100% of wages during the first six months of confinement and 40-
60% after that. Workers totally disabled at work receive a pension of
750 of their wages for life. Non-job related total disability carries with
it a pension of 40-50% of total wages depending on need. Wherever
possible, management is obliged to find new, more suitable
employment for partially injured workers but in no case may the new
salary, plus the partial disability payment, equal more than the old
wage. Workers and lineal dependents receive free treatment at the clinic
or hospital maintained by the enterprise but the dependents must bear
part of the cost of medicine.
Death benefits are paid to the family of deceased workers at the rate
of three months' wages for job-related death; two months wages for
death occurring off the job. In addition, each family may receive a
monthly pension equal to about 25-50% of the worker's wages until the
family is no longer in need of additional assistance. An amount equal
to one-half of the monthly average wage of the worker is paid in case
of the death of any family member over the age of ten.
Chinese industrial workers ordinarily retire at age 60 and women at
73 Sxe BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, DIGEST NO.
20. LABOR CONDITIONS IN CHINA (COMMUNIST) 3. In some areas state built houses go vacant
because of excessively high rentals,
74 LABOUR INSURANCE REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 26 February
1951. amended 2 January 1953.
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50 with both retiring five years sooner in jobs requiring hard physical
labor. The retirement pension ranges from 40-70% of wages depending
on the number of years the worker has been employed in a particular
enterprise, the number of years of continuous service, and the type of
occupation.75 In all cases, the worker may continue to work beyond the
retirement age if his services are needed in the enterprise. Travel
expenses to the place of retirement are paid for by the insurance fund
and retired workers continue to receive free medical benefits. Provision,
of course, is made for higher benefits to model workers. A 1955 decree
covering those workers who are unable to continue working but who
fail to fall within the ordinary retirement regulations makes provision
for a lump sum retirement payment."
The regulations concerning maternity leave allow 56 days combined
leave before and after childbirth with an additional 14 days permitted
in cases of difficult labor. Up to 30 days leave is permitted for
miscarriages upon the recommendation of a doctor." Workers who are
required to live away from their spouse or family so that they cannot
visit them on established holidays receive home leave once a year. The
leave period is from two to three weeks depending on distance. Travel
expenses are paid by the worker but management is required to provide
a subsidy for needy workers.7"
The insurance program is theoretically administered by trade union
committees who must report to regional or municipal committees. The
All China Federation of Trade Unions administers the total program
and is responsible directly to the Ministry of Labor. In actuality,
however, management often handles these matters, particularly in state
organs, and the Party dictates over-all policy and is responsible for its
enforcement although it may act through the trade union, the state or
local party agency.
In addition to social insurance, the state, unions and factories
provide free cultural and recreational facilities for the workers and their
75. PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS GOVERNING RETIREMENT OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS, Dec, 29,
1955. reprinted in UNITED STATES JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE. LABOR LAWS AND
REGULATIONS IN COMMUNIST CHINA 7 (1958).
76. PROVISION FOR TERMINATION OF SERVICES, 29 December 1955, reprinted in UNITED STATES
JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE, LABOR LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN COMMUNIST CIIINA
9 (1958).
77. STATE COUNCIL REGULATION CONCERNING MATERNITY LEAVE, 26 April 1955. reprinted
in UNITED STATES JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE, LABOR LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN
COMMUNIST CHINA 1 (1958).
78. See R. DEVERALL, PEOPLE'S CHINA: SWEAT SHOP ARSENAL 196-218 (2nd cd. 1954).
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families. In Shanghai, for example, the textile workers alone have over
400 recreational clubs, several choral, dancing and art societies, and
over 600 child care centers. 79 Trade newspapers, worker discussion
groups and a theatre for worker-written plays comprise a part of the
recreational program. Partly due to the lack of trained personnel, and
partly due to inexperience, Communist sources have revealed that in
many cases labor insurance funds have not been properly used for the
benefit of the workers, particularly during the early stages of
implementing the program. Little is known of how the Cultural
Revolution affected the social insurance and related programs.
IX. TRADE UNIONS
"Mass organizations are the tentacles which enable the government
and Party to extend their control to the various groups and levels of
the population. "10 The mass organization, a unique aspect of
Communist life, bridges the gap between the Party and the government
on the one hand, and the individual on the other, reaching each person
in his social or professional role in ways in which the government
cannot. And the labor union is the prototype of the mass organization.
As former consul-general 0. Edmund Clubb observed:
[Tihe labor organizations function no longer to look simply to the
benefit of labor but, apart from dealing with labor-management
contracts and handling labor welfare, to indoctrinate labor, to increase
production and carry out state policies."
An indication of organized labor's mobilization and involvement in
the over-all Communist purpose readily can be seen in a brief study of
the "Three Anti" and "Five Anti" campaigns of the early 1950s.
These campaigns were ostensibly to root out corruption, fight waste
and bureaucratism, and eliminate shoddy, inferior workmanship on
government projects (several high officials at the time maintained large
offices, possessed foreign cars, yet did little productive work), but the
campaigns were also prompted by the mounting costs of the Korean
conflict. Private merchants, manufacturers, and the middle class were
the principal targets. During the campaigns, labor leaders and
unions-at the behest of the government and the party-applied
79 St, K CHAO, THE MNAss ORGANIZ.TION IN COMMUNIST CHINA 45 (1953).
80 Chen & Chen, The 'Three Anti and 'Five Ann' Movements in Communist China, 26 PAC.
App 3, 14 (1953).
81 0 CLUBB, TWENTIETH CENTURY CHINA 312 (1964).
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pressure on businessmen to "confess their sins," reveal their illegal
profits and return "stolen" money to the people. The Workers Dail ',
the organ of the All China Federation of Trade Unions, said on May
1, 1952: "Under the leadership of the Economy Checkup Committee,
trade unions should organize the working masses to supervise the
capitalists so that they may be restrained from repeating acts of the
'five poisons.' This is the main task confronting employees and
workers in private enterprises." 2 The unions did a good job of rooting
out "corruption" and by the time the campaigns ended, businessmen,
though not toally eliminated as a class, had been stripped of their
wealth and self-respect. The government had acquired large sums of
money from the business community, many of the former high party
officials had been executed, and the labor unions had been transformed
into a vital and important instrument of governmental control.
There is, or at least was, virtually total identity of program among
the government, the party, and the trade unions. This unity was
fostered by the close interlocking of top leadership between the party
and the ACFTU, the national labor organization. However, as of early
1967, the status of the ACFTU was doubtful, as its offices were taken
over by supporters of the Cultural Revolution while its publication,
Workers' Daily, was suspended. The organization's position in the
post-Cultural Revolution period continues to remain in doubt although
it is likely that the union, like other institutions, will experience a
leadership change rather than dissolution.
The ACFTU was founded in 1922 and all local unions are required
to be affiliated with it.3 The union claimed 21 million members as of
1963, and like the party and other mass organizations, it is organized
in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism with ultimate
theoretical authority vested in a National Congress. No national
congress has been held, however, since 1957. The Congress defines
policy and tasks for the member unions, approves reports designed to
insure the fulfillment of state production plans, and determines the
tasks of the international labor movement. The Executive Committee
is responsible for policy during the recess of the Congress and the
twenty-eight man Presidium directs the organization during any recess
of the Executive Committee. The real power, as might be expected,
82. See Intellectual Freedom, Red China Style (testimony of Chi-chou Huang), Hearings
before House Un-American Activities Committee. 87TH CONGRESS, 2d Sess., 1165, 1208 (1962).
83. THE TRADE UNION LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. I.
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rests with the few party veterans who hold all the important executive
positions. Their power was solidified when a change from the 1948
Constitution eliminated from the national organization those unions
which, although supporting the Communist program, were not
Communist affiliated. 4
Membership in a union is voluntary although some official
Regulations offer union members special benefits. The insurance law,
for example, provides that union members receive twice the amount of
certain benefits as non-union workers. All wage workers, including
specifically "manual and brain workers . ..whose wages constitute
their sole or main means of livlihood . . .shall have the right to
organize trade unions. ' 5 This grouping of all workers is in keeping
with the ideological concept of equalitarianism, but the social status of
intellectuals, technicians and administrative personnel-at least prior to
the last two or three years-had remained above that of the ordinary
worker. This is in keeping with the dichotomy long established in
Chinese custom. Women, of course, have equal rights. With
membership dues set at 1% of the worker's wages, any additional cost
of union unkeep is paid for by placing a tax on the factory equal to
2% of the total wages paid. The Trade Union Law gives union
representatives the right to inspect factories and enterprises and, in the
days of private enterprise, all contracts between state agencies and
private enterprises were required to be signed by a union official. In
addition, the international arm of the union maintains friendly
relations with Communist labor movements in 50 other countries and
plays an active propaganda role in world affairs. The unions frequently
invite foreign labor leaders, both Communist and non-Communist, to
visit China. Most unions also perform diverse quasi-governmental
functions such as the administration of the national insurance program.
The unions, too, have been plagued by inefficiency and dishonesty.
Following a widely publicized scandal in 1950 in which a cadre
absconded with about $6,500 in union funds, the ACFTU adopted a
number of measures aimed at improving its financial structure. And,
as noted above, the top leadership of the union has been deposed during
the recent purge.
X. CONCLUSION
Much remains unknown about the labor law and problems within
mainland China. Indeed, much remains unknown about every aspect
84. See CHAo, note 79, supra, at 7.
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of Chinese life. Information is scarce. Labor law frequently consists
only of official decrees and sporadic interpretations which often appear
in the form of letters to the editor of Chinese newspapers. Even such
decrees may reflect aspirations rather than actual practice. The lack of
many fixed rules offers the leadership the flexibility which it feels it
must possess in order to make effective changes in policy.
It is clear, however, that Chinese labor policy, although not
uniformly successful, resulted generally in higher wages, better living
conditions, and greater personal security for the individual and his
family. The price in human terms may have been high, but as Professor
John Fairbank astutely stated:
In the new China, as in the old, the individual is given a different
evaluation in society and vis-a-vis the state. We may well argue that our
evaluation of the individual and the institutions by which we protect him
are preferable. But we cannot show how our view can ever be realized
within the crowded circumstances of Chinese life."
"[T]he potentialities of our type of individual freedom under law are
limited in China. The alteinatives to Communist tyranny there must
be sought by the Chinese people within a narrower range of possibility
than we would like. We have to face the implications of this fact.""7
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss4/2
